Statistical interval: November 2, 2026-November 8
Both sets of figures hold true at the same time: the backlog of orders surged to 226.1 million revised gross tonnage, exceeding the old peak in September 2008; the Drewry index fell 1% to US$4,389 in the same week. The shipbuilding end is scrambling for 2029 ship slots, and the shipping end is already pricing the excess for 2027, with a three-year delivery lag. Oil tankers are the only species still reaping supply dividends, VLCC Middle East Gulf-China TCE 1.346 million US dollars per day, relying on the fact that flights to Hormuz have not been resumed.
USTR has pushed the port fees originally scheduled to take effect on November 10 to January 9, 2027. In the same week, Dexiang ordered two 11,000TEU ships at Waigaoqiao, and PIL ordered seven 1,400TEU methanol reserved ships at Yellow Sea Shipbuilding.
what does it mean: The policy targets ships "built in China", but shipowners continue to place orders in China because the ship slots that can be replaced are not elsewhere. Port fees can be passed on or bypassed, and ship slots cannot be bought. My inference: The ones under pressure are foreign shipowners and exporters carrying American goods, not Chinese shipyards.
Order coverage has increased from 1.4 years to 3.7 years, and the backlog of orders is equivalent to 19% of the existing fleet (7% six years ago). The best shipyards’ 2028 production capacity has been booked to 164%, and about 78% is delivered on schedule. From 2027 to 2028, it is postponed by 10 million to 11 million CGT per year.
what does it mean: This is the only evidence this week that translates "order fever" into "when will capacity arrive". The bottleneck is the shipping platform and people, so ship prices will continue to rise: 10000/11500TEU has risen from 118 million to 123 million. Capacity growth in the next two years is lower than the order book implies, but there will be a surplus of all ship types when delivered in 2029-2030. Source: Splash247 (via Danish Ship Finance)
Revenue in the third quarter increased by 27% to US$18.1 billion, and the basic EBITDA guidance for the year was raised from 105-12.5 billion to 140-14.5 billion. The next day, WCI fell by 1%, and Shanghai-New York fell by 3%. During the same period, the container volume of Shanghai Port increased by 9.8% in October, and Ningbo and Zhoushan increased by 5.6%.
what does it mean: The performance is based on the locked freight rate in the third quarter, which is a quarterly time difference between the "performance peak" and the "freight peak". The volume has increased and the price has fallen, indicating that the decline is due to more ships rather than less cargo: there will be 3 empty flights next week, less than 5 this week. The initiative for the 2027 long-term contract lies with the cargo owner.
TD3C rose 48 points in the week to WS1262.5; Scorpio's LR2 averaged US$181,000 per day in the fourth quarter; International Seaways' net profit in the third quarter was US$344 million, with a dividend of US$5.05. However, Iran pressed the plan to 48 hours, and the Qatar LNG ship "Al Mayeda" that had been released by it in advance was still attacked near the strait.
what does it mean: This is not a boom in demand, but capacity being taken away - ships are being repaired, being detoured, and waiting for insurance. Therefore, the shipowners' actions are dividend repurchases rather than expansion; this week's new orders (Venergy added 4 VLCCs in Hengli, China Merchants Nanyou plans to build 4 LR2s) are all scheduled for 2029, which cannot save the current gap. Once sailing resumes and premiums fall, this price will not be supported.
According to Clarkson data from Lloyd's Register: 1,942 ships are on order, accounting for 47% of the tonnage; 25 ports actually supply methanol, and only one port in Ulsan is used for commercial ammonia bunkering; 385 methanol ships and 45 ammonia ships are on order. During the same period, Dalian Shipbuilding started building the world's first 113,000-ton liquid ammonia dual-fuel Afra.
what does it mean: Shipowners bought "fuel flexibility options", betting that the network would be completed after 2029. But what terminals and energy companies saw was 25 to 385 - no one would build an ammonia terminal for 45 ammonia ships. The result is that these ships burn diesel for a long time, and the premium cannot be recovered.
Main line 1: The impact of oil tanker supply has entered the second half, and the high level will exceed expectations. Support: TD3C 1.346 million US dollars/day, LR2 181 thousand in the fourth quarter, INSW payout rate above 85%; drivers are unresumption of sailings, engine room strikes, and detours to extend tonnage miles. Judgment: 1-3 months of high volatility, new ships will arrive as early as 2029. Falsification signals: Traffic volume returns to more than 80% of the pre-war period and war insurance rates fall.
Main line two: Production capacity is the real constraint of this cycle, and the risk is pushed to 2029. Support: 226.1 millionCGT, covering 3.7 years, China accounts for 68%, and production capacity is booked to 164% in 2028. Judgment: Capacity growth in 2027-2028 is lower than the order book implies, and the boom is longer than expected; the excess in delivery in 2029-2030 will come all at once. False signals: Public statistics with an on-schedule delivery rate of less than 70% appear, or the shipyard announces that the 2029 slipway is sold out.
Main line three: Green fuel has changed from a selling point to a cost issue, and the market has not set a price yet. Support: Alternative fuel ships account for 47%, and there are 25 methanol ports; Singapore VLSFO is US$1,003.50/ton, an increase of more than 92% from 521.50 at the end of February, and a single bill of 3,000 tons is about US$3 million (about 1.56 million before the war). Judgment: The "green premium" for 1-3 months was pushed back in the lease negotiations, and the first bite was fuel costs. It is most detrimental to old non-eco ships. False signal: Methanol bunkering port will double in the short term.
What really happened this week was not the "shipbuilding boom", but that the three risks of shipping capacity, fuel, and delivery were all pushed to centralized settlement after 2029 - orders and guidance only covered the risks.
This week, 58 information items were included, 15 of which were included in the analysis of this report.